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The #MeToo movement, a global social response to sexual har-
assment in the workplace, has turned the traditional approach to 
sexual harassment on its head. Instead of shielding perpetrators 
and discrediting survivors, employers, the media, and the public 
have begun to shift from presuming the credibility of the perpe-
trator to presuming the credibility of the survivor. But this up-
ending of the status quo has occurred almost entirely in the social 
sphere—and the legal system, where survivors of workplace sexu-
al harassment can seek remedies for the abuse they have suffered, 
is proving much slower to adapt.
While our social presumptions are flipping to center the behavior 
of the accused instead of the accuser, the legal standard for work-
place sexual harassment still focuses squarely on the victim’s rea-
sonableness. In order to bring a legally actionable claim of sexual 
harassment, a victim must demonstrate that she was objectively 
and subjectively reasonable in believing that she was subjected to 
sexual harassment. Even if she succeeds in demonstrating this, if 
her employer had mechanisms in place to address sexual harass-
ment, she must also demonstrate that her response to her harass-
ment—such as reporting or not reporting the harassment through 
an employer’s complaint process—was reasonable.
This Comment analyzes the effects of the #MeToo movement on 
federal courts’ definitions of sexual harassment under the existing 
legal standard. Since reasonableness is a socially-defined term, 
courts have plenty of room to incorporate shifting conceptions of 
sexual harassment into their jurisprudence—but many are re-
markably slow to do so. While it is too soon to state definitively 
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what effect #MeToo will have on sexual harassment law in the 
long run, this Comment should leave practitioners and scholars 
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I. Introduction
In October 2017, the #MeToo movement began to offer what tra-
ditional sexual harassment law has not yet provided: a social presump-
tion in favor of victims’ allegations, and, in many cases, a renunciation 
of the status long afforded to powerful harassers.1 This seemingly inde-
1. The social standards for sexual harassment since #MeToo have become much less 
deferential to the accused individual. See, e.g., Joan C. Williams, #MeToo Changed 
Norms, Not the Law, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com
/opinion/articles/2019-11-20/-metoo-changed-sexual-harassment-norms-not-the-law 
[https://perma.cc/FZ54-FZEP]. By contrast, in cases just preceding the #MeToo 
movement, courts dismissed harassment claims that included sexual references from 
coworkers, repeated remarks about plaintiffs’ body parts, and other forms of sexual 
propositioning. Sandra F. Sperino & Suja A. Thomas, Boss Grab Your Breasts? That’s
Not (Legally) Harassment, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com
/2017/11/29/opinion/harassment-employees-laws-.html [https://perma.cc/LE83-
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fatigable movement has not yet lost steam.2 In addition to pressuring 
companies to rid themselves of predators and encouraging men to 
reevaluate their past actions, #MeToo has also spurred greater litigation 
efforts. For the fiscal year of 2018, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC), the federal agency that enforces civil rights laws 
against workplace discrimination, including sexual harassment, saw a 
13.6% increase in charges alleging sexual harassment and itself filed 
50% more lawsuits challenging sexual harassment than in the prior fis-
cal year.3 Moreover, soon after the #MeToo movement began, polling 
showed that the percentage of Americans who stated that they believe 
that sexual harassment is a serious problem was 64%.4 Eighty-six per-
PHZB]. While certain lone instances of sexual harassment have made waves in the 
news, a lone instance of sexual harassment does not typically meet the severe or per-
vasive legal standard of a “hostile work environment,” which is the legal classification 
for one of the two types of sexual harassment that the Supreme Court has recognized 
(the other being “quid pro quo”). CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 1050-
52 (3d ed. 2016); see, e.g., Patrick Dorrian, Boss’s Overheard Sex Talk Not Harassment, 
Court Says, BLOOMBERG L. (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.bna.com/bosss-overheard-
sex-n57982090148/ [https://perma.cc/97CE-JSXX].
2. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Where #MeToo Came from, and Where It’s Going,
ATLANTIC (Mar. 24, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/03
/catharine-mackinnon-what-metoo-has-changed/585313/ [https://perma.cc/RF64-
94XR].
3. What You Should Know: EEOC Leads the Way in Preventing Workplace Harassment,
U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.eeoc.gov
/eeoc/newsroom/wysk/preventing-workplace-harassment.cfm [https://perma.cc
/S2EY-LXW5]. For the fiscal year of 2019, the number of charges filed with the 
EEOC alleging sexual harassment was comparable to prior years. Charges Alleging 
Sex-Based Harassment (Charges Filed with EEOC) FY 2010-FY 2019, U.S. EQUAL 
EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (2020), https://www.eeoc.gov/enforcement/charges-
alleging-sex-based-harassment-charges-filed-eeoc-fy-2010-fy-2019 [https://perma.cc
/5FE6-DSA9]. The EEOC had previously found that many women experience sexual 
harassment in the workplace without perceiving it to be such. CHAI R. FELDBLUM &
VICTORIA A. LIPNIC, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, REPORT OF THE 
CO-CHAIRS OF THE SELECT TASK FORCE ON THE STUDY OF HARASSMENT IN THE 
WORKPLACE (June 2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_force/harassment
/report.cfm [https://perma.cc/9W8Z-WQDM]. A 2016 report showed that surveys 
using probability samples found that only 25% of women experienced “sexual har-
assment” if given a question incorporating the phrase, but when given more specific 
descriptors, such as “unwanted sexual attention,” the incidence rate increased to 
60%. Id. Further, when given actual examples of behavior constituting sexual har-
assment, the incidence rate was as high as 75%. Id. The #MeToo movement may en-
courage individuals both to bring more claims of sexual harassment and to identify 
more instances of sexual harassment for what they are. This, in turn, could encourage 
even more legal claims or formal complaints.
4. Joan C. Williams, Jodi Short, Margot Brooks, Hilary Hardcastle, Tiffanie Ellis & 
Rayna Sharon, What’s Reasonable Now? Sexual Harassment Law After the Norm Cas-
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cent of Americans now endorse a zero-tolerance policy regarding sexual 
harassment in the workplace.5
The post-#MeToo definition of sexual harassment—unwelcome or 
uninvited sexual behavior in the workplace—may not seem particularly 
new.6 But this definition just a year prior allowed then-presidential can-
didate Donald Trump to minimize his recorded boasting of forcible 
kissing and groping as “locker-room talk.”7 Since then, the cultural def-
inition has broadened to encompass a range of conduct, including lewd 
comments or suggestive emails—behaviors that had always fit the tech-
nical definition of sexual harassment, but which were easier for the pub-
lic to treat as insignificant.8 Beyond this, the #MeToo movement has 
more broadly offered a presumption that an accuser is not operating 
under an ulterior motive; a cultural context acknowledging sexual har-
assment as pervasive in the American (and global) workplace; and a 
stricter conception of how sexual harassment should be punished or de-
terred, at least in the public arena.9
This shift is evidence of a “norm cascade”—a sea change in what 
behaviors are widely considered to constitute sexual harassment and 
cade, 2019 MICH. ST. L. REV. 139, 142 (2019) [hereinafter Williams et al.] (citing 
Gary Langer, Unwanted Sexual Advances Not Just a Hollywood, Weinstein Story, Poll 
Finds, ABC NEWS (Oct. 17, 2017), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/unwanted-
sexual-advances-hollywood-weinstein-story-poll/story?id=50521721 [https://perma.cc
/V8LS-Y42Z]).
5. Id. at 145; Williams, supra note 1; Chris Jackson, American Attitudes on Sexual Har-
assment, IPSOS (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/news-polls/npr-sexual-
harassment-2017-12-14 [https://perma.cc/7YL4-RT89].
6. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 1 (citing The Behaviors Americans Count as Sexual Har-
assment, BARNA (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.barna.com/research/behaviors-
americans-count-as-harassment/ [https://perma.cc/6M4J-372G]).
7. David A. Fahrenthold, Trump Recorded Having Extremely Lewd Conversation About 




8. See, e.g., Debra Birnbaum, CBS Diversity Showcase Director Rick Najera Exits amid 
Harassment Allegations, VARIETY (Oct. 26, 2017), https://variety.com/2017/tv/news
/cbs-diversity-showcase-director-rick-najera-exits-harassment-allegations-
1202600365/ [https://perma.cc/B6BV-C6Z6] (detailing the ousting of Rick Najera, a 
producer at CBS, who resigned after he was accused of making lewd comments to 
performers during an annual sketch comedy showcase); Suki Kim, Public-Radio Icon 
John Hockenberry Accused of Harassing Female Colleagues, CUT (Dec. 1, 2017), 
https://www.thecut.com/2017/12/public-radio-icon-john-hockenberry-accused-of-
harassment.html [https://perma.cc/BFG8-X7SB] (detailing the retirement of radio 
journalist John Hockenberry after investigations into unwelcome overtures to women
employees and bullying behavior toward women of color co-hosts).
9. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 1.
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what might be considered “reasonable” for a victim or an employer to 
perceive as problematic.10 But while the court of public opinion has 
shifted, whether the courts themselves will shift with it is another mat-
ter.
Institutions that previously protected predators in their ranks have 
increasingly yielded to public pressure to cut ties with those accused.11
At present, however, such institutions and individuals may face a greater 
threat from public shaming than from litigation. Though public percep-
tion of what constitutes sexual harassment may have expanded, the legal 
standards governing civil sexual harassment claims can be far more 
stringent, offering robust protections for those accused of harassment. 
In part, this is a matter of line-drawing in vastly different contexts. The 
cultural movement against sexual harassment does not necessitate one
particular outcome for the accused harasser and can operate on a sliding 
scale: In response to some behaviors, the public may expect resignations 
or firings, and in response to others only explanations or apologies. But 
to define a behavior as sexual harassment in legal terms creates legal lia-
bility.12
The Supreme Court first recognized the legal claim of workplace 
sexual harassment13 in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson in 1986, three 
decades before the groundswell of #MeToo.14 In fact, the codification of 
10. See generally Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics 
and Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887 (1998) (empirically establishing the rela-
tionship of “norm cascades” with law and society); Williams et al., supra note 4, at 
149-54 (describing four new norms post-#MeToo as evidence of a “norm cascade”).
See also Catharine A. MacKinnon, #MeToo Has Done What the Law Could Not, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/04/opinion/metoo-law-
legal-system.html [https://perma.cc/HD5Y-2M5L].
11. Audrey Carlsen, Maya Salam, Claire Cain Miller, Denise Lu, Ash Ngu, Jugal K. Patel 
& Zach Wichter, #MeToo Brought Down 201 Powerful Men. Nearly Half of Their Re-
placements Are Women., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com
/interactive/2018/10/23/us/metoo-replacements.html [https://perma.cc/3VBQ-
2ESB].
12. Sexual harassment falls within prohibited sex discrimination under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (Westlaw through P.L. 116-259) 
(discussed infra Section I.A). See also MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 1050-52 (de-
scribing legally actionable types of sexual harassment). Of course, such liability is sub-
ject to legal defenses, discussed infra Section III.
13. Sexual harassment law can be divided into two distinct types of claims: “quid pro 
quo” and hostile work environment harassment. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 
1050-52. The former involves the exchange of sexual favors for advancement in the 
workplace; the latter depends on a generally sex-based discriminatory environment. 
Id. This Comment will focus only on the hostile work environment form, inter-
changeably referred to as “workplace sexual harassment.”
14. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).
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sexual harassment law, through cases like Meritor, could be considered 
the prerequisite for this later cultural movement by bringing the issue to 
the fore, offering victims of sexual harassment a form of redress, and es-
tablishing a deterrence mechanism for mistreatment in the workplace.15
But along with this landmark decision came obstacles for plaintiffs at-
tempting to convince judges and juries that what had happened to them 
constituted sexual harassment. One such hurdle is the use of a “reasona-
bleness” standard at two points in the evaluation of a claim.16 The 
standard asks factfinders to determine: 1) Was a victim objectively and 
subjectively reasonable in believing that she was subjected to sexual har-
assment; and 2) if the employer had mechanisms in place to address 
sexual harassment, was the victim’s response to her harassment reasona-
ble?17 This standard has left many women—and men18—without re-
course against workplace harassers. Legal reasonableness has always been 
defined by and reflective of the existing social status quo.19 As long as 
that status quo is unequal, reasonableness both represents and gives cov-
er to that inequality. The #MeToo movement offers an opportune mo-
ment to redefine what constitutes reasonableness in the legal sphere as it 
has already done in the public sphere. Courts have already begun to 
reckon with how to evaluate this cultural definition of reasonableness 
amidst an ongoing cultural revolution.20
15. See MacKinnon, supra note 2.
16. Note that this court-imposed standard has no basis in the text of Title VII of the Civ-
il Rights Act of 1964 and was instead imported from tort law. See 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 2000e-2 (Westlaw through Pub. L. 116-259).
17. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 745 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,
807 (1998). See infra Section I.B.
18. Men, of course, also experience sexual harassment, but at much lower rates than 
women. See, e.g., Michael Alison Chandler, Men Account for Nearly 1 in 5 Complaints 
of Workplace Sexual Harassment with the EEOC, WASH. POST (Apr. 8, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/social-issues/men-account-for-nearly-1-in-5-
complaints-of-workplace-sexual-harassment-with-the-eeoc/2018/04/08/4f7a2572-
3372-11e8-94fa-32d48460b955_story.html [https://perma.cc/XYE3-NYSC]. Given 
those lower rates, the women-centered discourse around #MeToo, and the predomi-
nance of women as plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases, this Comment largely focus-
es on sexual harassment against women.
19. “Legal standards for reasonableness and unwelcomeness . . . themselves refer to social 
standards . . . .” Berkeley Talks Transcript: Feminist Legal Scholar Catharine MacKin-
non on the Butterfly Politics of #MeToo, BERKELEY NEWS (June 7, 2019), 
https://news.berkeley.edu/2019/06/07/berkeley-talks-transcript-catharine-
mackinnon-metoo-conference/ [https://perma.cc/8FCZ-K6LY].
20. See infra Sections II and III.
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This Comment explores how federal courts are responding to the 
cultural shift in perceptions of what constitutes sexual harassment. It 
begins with background on the existing legal standards in sexual har-
assment law. Taking those standards in turn, it then catalogues where 
federal courts currently stand in their application of those standards 
primarily by evaluating summary judgment decisions, as such decisions 
reflect courts’ line-drawing with respect to which behaviors can fit the 
definition of sexual harassment. While it is too soon to state definitively 
what effect #MeToo will have on sexual harassment law, this Comment 
should leave practitioners and scholars with a clear picture of the direc-
tion circuit courts have taken with regard to sexual harassment law since 
#MeToo.21
A. The Creation of the Reasonable Victim
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the federal anti-
discrimination law barring discrimination in the workplace on the basis 
of sex and other protected characteristics, an employee may sue her em-
ployer for workplace sexual harassment.22 As the Supreme Court decid-
ed in Meritor, this includes having to operate in a hostile work environ-
ment as long as the conduct creating such an environment is “severe or
pervasive.”23 In 1993, the Court elaborated on this standard, holding in 
Harris v. Forklift Systems that “severity or pervasiveness” must be evalu-
ated on the basis of whether a reasonable person would experience the 
conduct at issue as hostile.24 Since the conduct in Meritor had been es-
pecially egregious—involving repeated rape over three years—in Harris,
the Court went out of its way to clarify that a wide range of behaviors, 
not just those rising to the level of sexual assault, could create a hostile 
21. Since #MeToo began, there has been some scholarship on its effect on courts and 
how the legal standards for sexual harassment law ought to change. See, e.g., Vicki 
Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, Again, 128 YALE L.J.F. 22 (2018); 
Ramit Mizrahi, Sexual Harassment Law After #MeToo: Looking to California as a 
Model, 128 YALE L.J.F. 121 (2018); Sarah David Heydemann & Sharyn Tejani, Legal
Changes Needed to Strengthen the #MeToo Movement, 22 RICH. PUB. INT. L. REV. 69, 
237, 249 (2019); Deborah L. Rhode, #MeToo: Why Now? What Next?, 69 DUKE L.J.
377, 422 (2019).
22. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (Westlaw through P.L. 116-259).
23. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
24. “Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or 
abusive work environment—an environment that a reasonable person would find 
hostile or abusive—is beyond Title VII’s purview.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 
U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
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work environment.25 The Court elucidated several factors for whether 
the harassment is sufficiently severe, stating that this must be deter-
mined by looking at all the circumstances, including “the frequency of 
the discriminatory conduct; . . . whether it is physically threatening or 
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably 
interferes with an employee’s work performance.”26 The Court also re-
quired as a necessary precondition that the plaintiff herself subjectively 
experienced the conduct as hostile—a standard judged separately from 
the objective test.27 Since Harris, the Court has also made it clear that an 
isolated incident will not rise to the level of egregiousness required by 
the severe or pervasive standard.28
25. Harris, 510 U.S. at 22.
26. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23. Note that the Court embedded yet another reasonableness 
standard into this totality-of-the-circumstances analysis with respect to work perfor-
mance interference. Id. at 22.
27. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22. Otherwise, per the Court, “the conduct has not actually 
altered the conditions of the victim’s employment, and there is no Title VII viola-
tion.” Id. This paper does not address the subjective standard, but it is worth consid-
ering whether courts’ analysis of the subjective reasonableness of the plaintiff may 
change over time. Even in a situation in which a plaintiff meets the objective reason-
ableness standard, her subjective perceptions could theoretically sink her case. In one 
pre-Harris case, for example, a district court held that a plaintiff “lacked credibility 
when she testified that she was offended by” pornographic materials distributed 
around her office since she had previously taken nude photographs. Burns v. 
McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 955 F.2d 559, 565 (8th Cir. 1992). Though the Eighth 
Circuit reversed and the opinion preceded the objective and subjective reasonableness 
tests, its analysis suggests that under those tests the district court would have found 
for the employer given the judge’s perception of the plaintiff’s subjective response to 
the harassment she faced. Id.
28. The Supreme Court has held that “isolated incidents (unless extremely serious)”
should not be considered a form of sexual harassment. Faragher v. City of Boca Ra-
ton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998). See also Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 
268, 271 (2001). The severity of that single or isolated incident apparently must be 
quite extreme: An influential Ninth Circuit case decided by former Judge Alex 
Kozinski, who himself has been credibly accused of sexual harassment, held that a 
coworker’s groping of the plaintiff’s breasts—something that led to his criminal con-
viction for sexual assault—did not qualify as severe or pervasive enough to constitute 
sexual harassment. Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 927 (9th Cir. 2000); 
Niraj Chokshi, Federal Judge Alex Kozinski Retires Abruptly After Sexual Harassment 
Allegations, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/18/us
/alex-kozinski-retires.html [https://perma.cc/5Y8W-8VKW]. Some deem this the 
“one free grab” or “single grope rule” case. See generally Williams et al., supra note 4; 
Heydemann & Tejani, supra note 21. Some scholars argue that an “overly stringent 
judicial application of the ‘severe or pervasive’ standard may have resulted from outli-
er decisions in early harassment jurisprudence, written by overwhelmingly older male 
judges hostile to harassment claims,” or are simply a misinterpretation of Supreme 
Court jurisprudence. Elizabeth C. Tippett, The Legal Implications of the MeToo 
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Circuit courts remain split as to whether the objective prong 
should take into account the plaintiff’s gender. In 1998, in Oncale v. 
Sundowner Offshore Services, the Court suggested in dictum that the ob-
jective reasonableness standard be modified to “a reasonable person in 
the plaintiff’s position,” though it did not expressly adopt such a standard 
as its holding.29 Today, despite Oncale, there is still substantial debate 
over whether the standard should consist of a reasonable person, reason-
able woman, or some other version of reasonableness that more explicit-
ly takes into account the victim’s characteristics. The majority of circuits 
that have decided this issue have either rejected gender specificity or 
maintained a reasonable person standard without addressing the issue of 
incorporating gender into the reasonableness analysis.30
In contrast, the Third and Ninth Circuits use a standard that ex-
plicitly incorporates the plaintiff’s gender. The Ninth Circuit first estab-
lished a “reasonable victim standard” in Ellison v. Brady.31 The Ellison 
Movement, 103 MINN. L. REV. 229, 241 (2018) (citing SANDRA F. SPERINO & SUJA 
A. THOMAS, UNEQUAL 37 (David Kairys ed., 2017)); Judith J. Johnson, License to 
Harass Women: Requiring Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment to Be “Severe or Per-
vasive” Discriminates Among “Terms and Conditions” of Employment, 62 MD. L. REV.
85, 86 (2003).
29. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1998) (emphasis 
added).
30. The Fifth Circuit has explicitly rejected the reasonable woman standard. DeAngelis v. 
El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass’n, 51 F.3d 591, 594 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The test is 
an objective one, not a standard of offense to a ‘reasonable woman.’”). The Sixth Cir-
cuit has also explicitly rejected the standard. Hartleip v. McNeilab, Inc., 83 F.3d 767, 
776 (6th Cir. 1996) (adopting Radtke v. Everett, 501 N.W.2d 155, 165 (Mich. 
1993) (holding that “a gender-conscious standard must be rejected”)). The Eighth 
Circuit previously applied a reasonable woman standard but then rejected the stand-
ard after Harris. Gillming v. Simmons Indus., 91 F.3d 1168, 1172 (8th Cir. 1996). 
The remaining circuits apply a gender-neutral reasonableness standard. See, e.g., Val-
entin-Almeyda v. Municipality of Aguadilla, 447 F.3d 85, 94 (1st Cir. 2006); Jen-
nings v. Univ. of N.C., 444 F.3d 255, 269 (4th Cir. 2006); Whittaker v. N. Ill. 
Univ., 424 F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir. 2005); Stinnett v. Safeway, Inc., 337 F.3d 1213, 
1219 (10th Cir. 2003); Watkins v. Bowden, 105 F.3d 1344, 1352, 1356 (11th Cir. 
1997). The Second Circuit previously weighed applying a reasonable woman stand-
ard, but ultimately side-stepped the issue. Petrosino v. Bell Atl., 385 F.3d 210, 221-
22 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[W]e need not choose between these two options because we 
conclude that the evidence in this case . . . would permit a jury to conclude that a rea-
sonable person, regardless of gender,” would deem the environment hostile.). For 
more on this issue, see Blair Druhan, Severe or Pervasive: An Analysis of Who, What, 
and Where Matters When Determining Sexual Harassment, 66 VAND. L. REV. 355, 
362-63 (2013) and Nicole Newman, The Reasonable Woman: Has She Made a Differ-
ence?, 27 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 529, 532-33 (2007). The Supreme Court has not 
commented on the matter since Oncale.
31. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991).
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analysis considers whether “a reasonable victim of the same sex as the 
plaintiff would consider the comments [or actions] sufficiently severe or 
pervasive to alter a condition of employment and create an abusive 
working environment.”32 Similarly, the Third Circuit has applied a 
standard of a “reasonable person of the same sex in that position.”33
If courts were to adopt the Oncale dicta measuring objectivity in 
terms of “a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position,” sexual harass-
ment law could adapt much faster to the changing societal demands of 
the moment. There is an intersectional evaluation implicit in the Oncale
approach, rendering it sensitive to inequality: “The plaintiff’s position”
naturally includes her race, gender, past experiences of sexual harass-
ment—which could exacerbate perceptions of or the harm experienced 
from a hostile work environment—and more.34 In the meantime, the 
application of different reasonableness standards creates dissimilitude in 
how plaintiffs are treated across circuits.35
32. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878 (“A complete understanding of the victim’s view requires, 
among other things, an analysis of the different perspectives of men and women. 
Conduct that many men consider unobjectionable may offend many women.”). This 
holding can be traced to Judge Damon Keith’s dissent in Rabidue v. Osceola Refining 
Co., in which the Sixth Circuit established a traditional reasonable person standard. 
Rabidue v. Osceola Refin. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 626 (Keith, J., dissenting). In his dis-
sent, Judge Keith argued that “the reasonable person perspective fails to account for 
the wide divergence between most women’s views of appropriate sexual conduct and 
those of men.” Id. Similarly, two influential pre-Oncale decisions reflect how courts 
can apply reasonableness standards that take into account the victim’s unique posi-
tion. In Hicks v. Gates Rubber, the Tenth Circuit determined that “[aggregating] evi-
dence of racial hostility with evidence of sexual hostility” was permissible to deter-
mine whether the plaintiff, a Black woman, was subjected to a hostile work 
environment. Hicks v. Gates Rubber, 833 F.2d 1406, 1416-17 (10th Cir. 1987). In 
Anthony v. County of Sacramento, where the plaintiff was a Black woman, the Eastern 
District of California maintained that “objective hostility is determined from the per-
spective of a reasonable person with the same fundamental characteristics as [the] 
plaintiff,” therefore analyzing how “a reasonable African-American woman” would 
have assessed the conduct alleged. Anthony v. County of Sacramento, 898 F. Supp. 
1435, 1447 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
33. Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990).
34. For more on this issue, see, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 1 at 1063-74; Angela 
Onwuachi-Willig, What About #UsToo?: The Invisibility of Race in the #MeToo 
Movement, 128 YALE L.J.F. 105, 109 (2018) (advocating for a “standard based on a 
reasonable person in the complainant’s intersectional and multidimensional shoes”); 
Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 445, 
464-71 (1997); Catharine MacKinnon, Directions in Sexual Harassment Law, 31 
NOVA L. REV. 2, 5 (2007) (arguing that “usually, it is perpetrators who have to be 
reasonable”).
35. See Newman, supra note 30, at 552-55.
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Before #MeToo—and in some circuit courts, after it—the standard 
for deeming workplace behaviors sexual harassment could be almost in-
surmountable for plaintiffs alleging less overtly outrageous offenses than 
what occurred in Meritor, even as courts applied the Harris factors. 
Courts across all circuits have dismissed cases involving allegations of 
unwelcome sexual advances or even battery from a harasser as not suffi-
ciently severe or pervasive to be actionable.36 Despite the range of behav-
iors Harris provides for, pre-#MeToo courts often required plaintiffs to 
have suffered the most egregious or cruel forms of harassing behavior in 
order to have a legally actionable claim. Only then could victims of sex-
ual harassment be confident they might be found “reasonable.”
B. The Reasonable Victim’s Response to Harassment
If a plaintiff is successful in arguing that she was the victim of 
workplace sexual harassment, employers may still escape liability 
through a second reasonableness test. Two companion cases from 1998 
established a reasonableness standard for both employers and plaintiffs 
in handling the aftermath of sexual harassment in the workplace. Taken 
together, Faragher v. City of Boca Raton and Burlington Industries v. 
Ellerth created what is colloquially known as the Faragher-Ellerth de-
fense: If there has been no tangible, adverse employment action against 
the plaintiff, such as a demotion or firing,37 employers may raise the 
two-prong affirmative defense that 1) they exercised reasonable care to 
prevent and correct the harassing behavior, and 2) the plaintiff unrea-
sonably failed to take advantage of corrective opportunities the employ-
36. See, e.g., Legrand v. Area Res. for Cmty. & Hum. Servs., 394 F.3d 1098, 1102-03
(8th Cir. 2005) (finding that explicit, unwelcome sexual advances were not severe or 
pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment); Burnett v. Tyco Corp., 203 
F.3d 980, 981, 984-85 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding that a single instance of battery, as 
well as multiple comments from the harasser to the plaintiff such as “Since you have 
lost your cherry, here’s one to replace the one you lost” when handing her a cough 
drop, did not create a hostile work environment); Mormol v. Costco Wholesale 
Corp., 364 F.3d 54, 58-59 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding that plaintiff’s manager’s repeated 
request for sex was not severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environ-
ment); Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1251 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc) 
(finding that supervisor’s constant following of the plaintiff, staring at her groin and 
rubbing against her did not constitute actionable harassment); Brooks v. City of San 
Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 927 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that a groping that resulted in a 
criminal conviction did not create a hostile work environment).
37. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3 (Westlaw through P.L. 116-259). Often, a tangible adverse 
employment action can support an employee’s case that she was harassed or discrimi-
nated against. Id.
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er provided.38 Yet again, the plaintiff is subjected to a purportedly objec-
tive reasonableness test, and another obstacle to making her case.
 
The #MeToo movement has created an atmosphere in which 
courts can reevaluate a plaintiff’s reasonableness with respect to the per-
ception of a hostile work environment and with respect to her response 
to that environment. This is because reasonableness is socially defined. 
In other words, to determine what a reasonable person would do, courts 
and juries necessarily impose a societal standard for what constitutes rea-
sonableness, which typically reflects the status quo.39 Now, a handful of 
post-#MeToo court decisions offer a snapshot of where courts may be 
headed in a society that has begun to reckon with its past expectations 
for and treatment of targets of sexual harassment.40 This development 
38. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 745 (1998).
39. See generally Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a 
Demosprudence of Law and Social Movements, 123 YALE L.J. 2740 (2014). This of 
course reflects the perennial question of whether culture drives law or vice versa (or 
perhaps whether both influence one another). Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres, eval-
uating the effect of racial justice activism on courts, argue that social movements have 
had “a decisive effect” on giving “heft and constitutional value” to legal changes. Id.
at 2743. In their view, those seeking social change “cannot simply rely on judicial de-
cisions as the solution” but instead must “integrate lawyers not as leaders but as fel-
low advocates” to create “a new paradigm” of “demosprudence”: democratic efforts 
that legitimize lasting legal change, not the equivalent of a great man theory for indi-
vidual judicial victories. Id. at 2749.  For more on how the legal and cultural aspects 
are intertwined, see LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY:
ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY (2002). Given 
the influence social activism can have on judicial approaches, the fact that the #Me-
Too movement arose in part out of social media may expedite its effects on the legal 
system, as victims of sexual harassment were able to congregate under a hashtag, am-
plifying one another’s stories in a way that would have been near-impossible before 
the internet age. See generally Stacey B. Steinberg, #Advocacy: Social Media Activism’s
Power to Transform Law, 105 KY. L.J. 413 (2016). For more on the effect of the in-
ternet on social movements and legal advocacy, see id.
40. Notably, as seen in the cases cited in Sections II.A-C and III, most of the decisions 
evaluating reasonableness since #MeToo involve litigation that began prior to the in-
ception of the movement in October 2017. E.g., Malin v. Orleans Par. Commc’n
Dist., 718 F. App’x 264 (5th Cir. 2018). If more cases arising from post-#MeToo 
understandings of sexual harassment are brought, an influx of cases involving single 
incidents or incidents not previously considered severe may encourage courts to 
reevaluate reasonableness as well—but not enough time has passed to track the spillo-
ver from the #MeToo movement into the types of claims being pursued through the 
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raises the question: If the creation of workplace sexual harassment law 
was a precondition for the #MeToo movement, could the movement be 
a precondition for broadening the legal definition of sexual harass-
ment?41
II. Reasonableness in Perceiving a Hostile Work Environment 
Post-#MeToo
In the three years since the #MeToo movement took off, federal 
courts have primarily only hinted at how their application of the reason-
ableness standard might change.42 As of yet, no court has commented 
expressly on the influence of #MeToo on the reasonableness test.43 It 
may be too soon to tell definitively the direction that courts are moving 
in with respect to this standard, but some cases offer insight.
Though the majority of courts purport to apply a gender-neutral 
model for reasonableness, the type of reasonableness standard courts ap-
ply does not necessarily appear to have an outcome-determinative ef-
fect.44 Notably, the courts that apply a gendered model, the Third and 
Ninth Circuits, have not re-assessed the hostile work environment rea-
sonableness standard since #MeToo began.45 Courts applying the gen-
der-neutral standard post-#MeToo fall on a spectrum of favorable to
legal system. There are also a number of other elements of sex discrimination law that 
the #MeToo movement stands to affect, including other prongs of hostile work envi-
ronment evaluations, educational sexual harassment claims arising under Title IX, 
and more.
41. See MacKinnon, supra note 2. Note that, to date, litigators have not made explicit 
#MeToo arguments in new briefs or complaints with respect to reasonableness, 
though the movement has come up in passing on some complaints. Docket Search 
Results for “#MeToo,” “#MeToo Movement,” “Me Too,” and “Me Too Move-
ment,” BLOOMBERG L., https://www.bloomberglaw.com (in Bloomberg Law, search 
starting point field for “#MeToo,” “Me Too,” “Me Too Movement,” and “#MeToo 
Movement” within the date range of 10/01/2017 to 03/05/2021; then narrow to fed-
eral courts and the categories “Civil Rights: Employment” and “Civil Rights: Other;”
yielding seventy-seven results) (last visited Mar. 5, 2020).
42. See infra Sections II.A-C.
43. See, e.g., all cases cited infra Section II.A-C. None of the opinions in these cases ex-
pressly mention #MeToo in their discussions of reasonableness.
44. Limited research into the effects of applying gender, or not, suggest there is no par-
ticular trend of success for plaintiffs depending on the standard used. See Newman, 
supra note 30, at 552-55 (tracking rates of plaintiff success in establishing a claim).
45. Citing References to 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2, WESTLAW, https://1.next.westlaw.com
(in Westlaw, search within “Citing References” of 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2; narrow to 
“Cases”; narrow to Third and Ninth Circuits, and search “hostile work environ-
ment”; yielding 188 case results) (last visited Mar. 14, 2021).
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unfavorable for plaintiffs; as others have noted, “Courts across the coun-
try lack a reliable metric for uniformly analyzing which conduct rises to 
[the] level of  ‘severe or pervasive.’”46
While several circuits have weighed in on this issue, decisions from 
the Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits best represent the varying ap-
proaches to reasonableness today. The Fifth Circuit offers a continua-
tion of the same application of the reasonableness standard that applied 
pre-#MeToo, while the Fourth and Seventh Circuits represent opposite 
ends of the spectrum: The Fourth Circuit has expanded its definition of 
reasonableness without commenting on the influence of #MeToo, while 
the Seventh Circuit has almost engaged in a backlash against the chang-
ing social standards for appropriate workplace behavior.47 To make mat-
ters more confusing, the EEOC—whose decisions courts and employers 
can look to when attempting to evaluate or create workplace stand-
ards—has been inconsistent in its own jurisprudence, falling all over this 
spectrum.48 Since the EEOC is one of many bodies that have been slow 
to adjust its reasonableness analysis and address the elephant in the 
room that is #MeToo, litigants are left uncertain of how, if at all, chang-
ing social norms will affect the legal standards to which their claims are 
held. An examination of summary judgment decisions shows how insu-
lar courts can be relative to the cultural movement, as in some cases 
courts can even be hostile to potentially meritorious claims.
A. Post-#MeToo, the Continuation of Pre-#MeToo Standards
Given the societal evolution stemming from #MeToo and the elas-
ticity of a reasonableness standard, a court that maintains the status quo 
of reasonableness—one in which only the most egregious or repetitive 
behaviors rise to the level of a hostile work environment—is effectively 
making a statement against the turning tides outside the courtroom. 
Ironically, courts that maintain narrow conceptions of reasonableness 
have invoked Oncale’s reminder that Title VII is not a “general civility 
code” despite the flexibility Oncale actually discussed extending to the 
reasonableness evaluation.49
46. Heydemann & Tejani, supra note 21, at 81.
47. See infra Section II.C.
48. EEOC decisions demonstrating this are discussed infra in each section. Note that the 
Supreme Court has held that the EEOC’s interpretation of Title VII should be given 
“great deference” and that courts should look to its decisions for guidance. Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
49. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1998).
2021] R E A S O N A B L E N E S S  I N  H O S T I L E  W O R K  E NV I R O N M E NT C A S E S 133
The preexisting standard that a single incident does not typically 
rise to the level of severity—and certainly not pervasiveness—required 
to create a hostile work environment quite clearly informs many post-
#MeToo decisions that continue to adhere to status-quo conceptions of 
reasonableness.50 Take, for instance, an EEOC administrative decision 
from March 2018.51 A technician for the Social Security Administration 
in Tulsa, Oklahoma alleged that an administrative law judge sexually 
harassed her by hitting her bottom with his cane and later referring to 
her as “Pocahontas,” leading the complainant to raise sexual and race 
harassment claims.52 The EEOC held that the singular instance of 
touching was not “so severe or pervasive . . . that a reasonable person 
would consider the conduct hostile.”53 Calling the incident “inappropri-
ate,” the EEOC reiterated the standard that “[n]ot every unpleasant or 
undesirable act which occurs in the workplace constitutes a discrimina-
tion violation.”54 But even repeated incidents that are more physical in 
nature may still not rise to the EEOC’s interpretation of the reasonable 
person standard. In one case in February 2019, the EEOC held that a 
man’s allegation of sexual harassment by his woman supervisor—
including three separate occasions during which she attempted to rub 
and massage him—did not meet the “reasonable person” standard.55
When a single incident involves a more explicitly physical alterca-
tion, the EEOC has deemed it severe enough for a reasonable person to 
perceive a hostile work environment. For instance, in Taryn S. v. 
O’Rourke, a medical support assistant alleged that a physician hugged 
her, forcibly grabbed her neck, kissed her, grabbed the belt loops of her 
pants, and persistently told her he wanted to have sex with her.56
Though the Department of Veterans Affairs’ agency review deemed this 
an isolated incident that a reasonable person would not find created a 
50. See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (noting “isolated 
incidents (unless extremely serious)” should not be considered a form of sexual har-
assment).
51. Marielle L., EEOC Appeal No. 0120162299, 2018 WL 1737437, at *1 (Mar. 29, 
2018).
52. Marielle L., 2018 WL 1737437, at *1. The complainant was “both Caucasian and 
Native American”; the EEOC made no decision with respect to the race discrimina-
tion claim because, it stated, there was not enough evidence that the remark was 
made in the first place. Id. at *5-6.
53. Marielle L., 2018 WL 1737437, at *2.
54. Marielle L., 2018 WL 1737437, at *6.
55. Monroe M., EEOC Appeal No. 0120172219, 2019 WL 1397601, at *1, *4-5 (Feb. 
28, 2019).
56. Taryn S., EEOC Appeal No. 0120162172, 2018 WL 4692613, at *1-2 (Sept. 14, 
2018).
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hostile work environment, the EEOC, without much elaboration, disa-
greed, stating only that in “certain circumstances” a single incident 
could be severe enough to create a hostile work environment.57 The 
EEOC also looked to the complainant’s subjective reasonableness, not-
ing that she was “embarrassed, humiliated, and nervous” as a result of 
the incident.58
This same reasoning persists in circuit courts. In Malin v. Orleans 
Parish Communications District, the Fifth Circuit held that a reasonable 
person would not believe that six interactions in which a woman human 
resources manager graphically described sexual encounters to the wom-
an plaintiff—despite her protestations—met the severe or pervasive 
threshold.59 Though the court referred to the commentary as “unprofes-
sional, unwelcome and distasteful,” it emphasized Oncale dicta that “Ti-
tle VII is not a ‘general civility code.’”60
Though courts do not necessarily misconstrue sexual harassment 
precedents by foreclosing relief for single incident claims, doing so at the 
summary judgment stage can demonstrate courts’ hostility to potentially 
meritorious claims. When judges grant summary judgment to defend-
ants in sexual harassment cases, they foreclose the jury’s ability to find 
the hostile work environment claim reasonable in favor of their own de-
termination that it is not. By preventing juries from weighing in on the 
reasonableness question, judges engage in line-drawing that may be out 
of step with today’s cultural climate, cutting many plaintiffs off from re-
lief that a post-#MeToo jury with its own conception of reasonableness 
might otherwise grant. By 2020, the Sixth and Eighth Circuits followed 
the same path as the Fifth Circuit, allowing summary judgment deci-
sions for defendants to stand in hostile work environment cases—taking 
it out of the jury’s hands—despite the potential for a trier of fact to find 
57. Taryn S., 2018 WL 4692613, at *9.
58. Taryn S., 2018 WL 4692613, at *9.
59. Malin v. Orleans Par. Commc’ns Dist., 718 F. App’x 264, 266, 272 (5th Cir. 2018). 
Malin involved a retaliation claim, but the Oncale standard still applies to determine 
whether the plaintiff engaged in a protected activity when reporting the incidents. Id.
at 272. The Malin court noted that in order to establish a retaliation claim, the plain-
tiff must prove she reasonably believed the conduct she reported was an unlawful 
employment practice under Title VII—again, the elusive reasonableness standard. Id.
(citing Byers v. Dallas Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 428 (5th Cir. 2000)).     
60. Malin, 718 F. App’x at 273 (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 
at 81 (1998)). The court did not comment on the shared gender of the women apart 
from an indirect reference to the “innocuous differences in the ways men and women 
routinely interact with members of the same sex.” Id.
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a valid claim.61 In McDaniel v. Wilkie, Natalie A. McDaniel, a Black 
woman employed by the Department of Veterans Affairs, alleged that
she was subjected to “inappropriate touching, comments, subjective
evaluations, workplace sabotage, false accusations of misconduct, failure
to promote, failure to grant her reasonable accommodation[,] and the
removal of the assets/tools necessary for her to perform her job.”62 More
specifically, she alleged that, among other transgressions, supervisors in-
appropriately asked whether women employees were in relationships
with other women employees; “stroked her hair”; and called her a
“bitch.”63 The Sixth Circuit upheld a district court’s decision to grant 
summary judgment to the defendants because “[e]ven viewed in the best 
light for her case, the events that McDaniel alleged [did] not show an 
environment ‘that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive,’”64
emphasizing from Supreme Court precedents that “simple teasing,”65
“‘offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) 
will not amount to’ a hostile work environment.”66 But a court could
choose to treat these repeated incidents as pervasive, in particular when 
the case is construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff at sum-
mary judgment, and allow the facts to come before a jury to make its 
own determination.67 In other words, especially in light of the #MeToo 
movement, a reasonable person could perceive these same behaviors as 
not isolated and more than simple teasing, characterizing them as sexual 
61. Courts review appeals of summary judgment decisions de novo. See, e.g., Eastman 
Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 465 n.10 (1992) (“[O]n sum-
mary judgment we may examine the record de novo without relying on the lower 
courts’ understanding . . . .”). When resolving summary judgment motions, courts 
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. E.g.,
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) 
(“[O]n summary judgment the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts . . .
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” (cita-
tion omitted)).
62. McDaniel v. Wilkie, No. 19-3304, 2020 WL 1066007, at *1 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 
2020) (quotation marks omitted).
63. McDaniel, 2020 WL 1066007, at *1.
64. McDaniel, 2020 WL 1066007, at *3 (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81-82).
65. McDaniel, 2020 WL 1066007, at *3 (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81-82).
66. McDaniel, 2020 WL 1066007, at *3 (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 
U.S. at 775, 787 (1998)) (citations omitted).
67. Certainly, the #MeToo movement has led to the treatment of these types of behav-
iors as forms of sexual harassment. See Birnbaum, supra note 8; Kim, supra note 8. 
But courts have contributed to this reform as well. See, e.g., Parker v. Reema Consult-
ing Servs., Inc., 915 F.3d 297, 300 (4th Cir. 2019) (holding the spread of a single 
rumor was a sufficient incident to meet the hostile work environment standard).
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harassment.68 Therefore, it is equally—perhaps more—plausible that 
these facts meet the hostile work environment standard and the claim 
should survive summary judgment to allow a jury to determine reasona-
bleness.
The Eighth Circuit even admitted as much, openly acknowledging 
the problematic behavior of a particular defendant while still deeming 
his behavior to be insufficient to survive a motion for summary judg-
ment.69 Jennifer Paskert, a sales associate at a used car dealership, 
brought a hostile work environment suit against her employer due to 
her supervisor Brent Burns’s treatment of her and other women.70 Ac-
cording to the evidence provided, Burns was, in the Eighth Circuit’s 
words, “volatile” and “frequently lost his temper with everyone”; he 
would “[use] derogatory names” for “female customers”; and his “treat-
ment of women was demeaning, sexually suggestive, and improper.”71
More than one person testified to having heard Burns remark that he 
“‘never should have hired a woman’ and wonder aloud if he could make 
Paskert cry.”72 Burns also “openly bragged at work about his purported 
sexual conquests.”73 On one occasion, another employee “witnessed 
Burns attempt to rub Paskert’s shoulders and say he was going to give 
her a hug.”74 One time, after Paskert criticized Burns’ treatment of her, 
he replied, “Oh, if you weren’t married and I wasn’t married, I could 
have you . . . You’d be mine . . . I’m a closer.”75
The court showed clear distaste for Burns’s conduct, calling it “cer-
tainly reprehensible and improper.”76 Despite this, the court held 
Burns’s conduct was still “not so severe or pervasive as to alter the terms 
and conditions of Paskert’s employment.”77 In part, this was because 
“Paskert only allege[d] one instance of unwelcome physical con-
68. See, e.g., Birnbaum, supra note 8 (detailing the ousting of Rick Najera, a producer at 
CBS, who resigned after he was accused of making lewd comments to performers 
during an annual sketch comedy showcase); Kim, supra note 8 (detailing the retire-
ment of radio journalist John Hockenberry after investigations into unwelcome over-
tures to women employees and bullying behavior toward women of color co-hosts); 
Carlsen et al., supra note 11 (detailing the range of behaviors that led to the firing or 
resignations of 201 men after #MeToo began).
69. Paskert v. Kemna-ASA Auto Plaza, Inc., 950 F.3d 535, 539 (8th Cir. 2020).
70. Paskert, 950 F.3d at 537.
71. Paskert, 950 F.3d at 537.
72. Paskert, 950 F.3d at 537.
73. Paskert, 950 F.3d at 537.
74. Paskert, 950 F.3d at 537.
75. Paskert, 950 F.3d at 537.
76. Paskert, 950 F.3d at 538.
77. Paskert, 950 F.3d at 538.
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tact . . . .”78 Of course, nothing in Harris or Oncale limits the definition 
of sexual harassment to physical contact.79 While the court did not 
mince words in stating that the defendants—both the company and 
Burns himself—”should both be embarrassed and ashamed” of their 
treatment of Paskert, it nonetheless stood firm that this behavior could 
not meet the severe or pervasive standard.80
B. The Path Toward Expansion
While the pre-#MeToo approach to reasonableness is alive and well 
in some circuits, there is reason to believe that the tides are turning in 
others. No court has yet overtly made reference to the #MeToo move-
ment in its reasonableness analysis, but reading between the lines of 
their decisions, there are hints that the movement-led cultural shift has 
influenced that analysis. While we are, as of yet, unable to empirically 
tie these courts’ willingness to uphold hostile work environment claims 
directly to the #MeToo movement, some courts’ treatment of less severe 
instances of harassment or less frequent harassing behaviors as legally 
cognizable is nonetheless in step with the movement’s cultural treatment 
of those same behaviors. In particular, by allowing the reasonableness 
evaluation to better incorporate the harm a plaintiff has suffered—that 
is, by allowing the effects of sexual harassment to support a finding that 
it occurred—courts offer a path for more plaintiff-friendly jurisprudence 
under the existing legal standard.
1. A Hedging Elaboration on Reasonableness
The Fourth Circuit has come the furthest in expanding its defini-
tion of reasonableness since #MeToo began. As early as January 2018—
mere months after #MeToo got underway—the Fourth Circuit reversed 
a district court’s order granting summary judgment to an employer on a 
hostile work environment claim in Hernandez v. Fairfax County.81
Magaly Hernandez, a firefighter, experienced regular harassment from 
her station captain including inappropriate touching, his use of his body 
to block her path, telling her he wanted to see her in a bathing suit, 
78. Paskert, 950 F.3d at 538.
79. See generally Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993); Oncale v. Sundowner 
Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
80. Paskert, 950 F.3d at 539.
81. Hernandez v. Fairfax County, 719 F. App’x 184, 187 (4th Cir. 2018).
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“and once [asking] Hernandez whether she would ‘be able to handle 
that big hose,’” which she understood to be a sexual innuendo.82
Though the station captain adjusted his behavior after Hernandez re-
ported his conduct to the station’s battalion chief, the station captain 
then began monitoring and tracking Hernandez’s movements at work.83
Nonetheless, the district court held that the conduct “was not sufficient-
ly severe or pervasive” under the objective reasonable person standard.84
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit disagreed and held that the facts could 
support a jury determination that Hernandez was subjected to a hostile 
work environment, particularly in light of the duration of the harass-
ment and the physical invasion of Hernandez’s space.85 Despite applying 
the same standards that led the Eighth Circuit to reject a similar sexual 
harassment claim in Paskert, the Fourth Circuit determined that the 
conduct at issue could reasonably meet the standard for a hostile work 
environment.86
More than a year later, in February 2019, the Fourth Circuit again 
reversed a district court’s decision in favor of an employer and expanded 
its interpretation of reasonableness in Parker v. Reema Consulting Ser-
vices.87 Evangeline Parker, a manager in a warehouse facility, alleged that 
male employees were circulating a rumor that she was promoted due to 
a sexual relationship with a higher-ranking manager.88 Parker alleged 
that she was generally treated with disrespect as a result, including being 
locked out of an all-staff meeting at which the rumor was discussed.89
The Fourth Circuit did not expressly comment on the objective and 
subjective reasonableness standards when offering its holding.90 Howev-
er, in holding that the alleged harassment was sufficiently severe or per-
vasive to be actionable, it noted that “the harassment was continuous, 
preoccupying not only Parker, but also management and the employees 
at the . . . facility for the entire time of Parker’s employment after her 
82. Hernandez, 719 F. App’x at 186.
83. Hernandez, 719 F. App’x at 186.
84. Hernandez, 719 F. App’x at 187.
85. Hernandez, 719 F. App’x at 187-88.
86. Hernandez, 719 F. App’x at 187-88; Paskert v. Kemna-ASA Auto Plaza, Inc., 950
F.3d 535, 537-39 (8th Cir. 2020).
87. Parker v. Reema Consulting Servs., Inc., 915 F.3d 297, 300 (4th Cir. 2019). The
lower court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss. Id. In addition to holding 
that the harassment was not severe or pervasive, the lower court held that the harass-
ment was not based on sex, which the Fourth Circuit also reversed. Id. at 301.
88. Parker, 915 F.3d at 300.
89. Parker, 915 F.3d at 300.
90. See Parker, 915 F.3d. 297.
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final promotion.”91 The Fourth Circuit went so far as to call the con-
duct against Parker “humiliating.”92 By implication, Parker was subjec-
tively reasonable, and the impact on the greater office indicated that the 
workplace environment was objectively hostile as well.93
Contrast this with the Eighth Circuit’s approach in Paskert, in 
which the court upheld a summary judgment holding for a defendant 
while condemning his behavior as “reprehensible and improper.”94
There, the Eighth Circuit denounced behavior as a matter of social mo-
res, but took pains to maintain a legal standard that allowed, by its own 
description, harm to the plaintiff. But if in the context of social mores, a 
reasonable person could—and did—deem this behavior “reprehensible 
and improper,” what separates that behavior from harassing behavior 
that is severe or pervasive? The court effectively admitted that this be-
havior was sexually harassing but nonetheless chose to adhere to an out-
dated formula for determining hostile work environments for no obvi-
ous reason other than custom. Unlike in the Eighth Circuit, the Fourth 
Circuit’s framing of the alleged behavior as “humiliating”—effectively 
synonymous with “reprehensible and improper”—gave the court room 
to account for the harm caused to the plaintiff as part of its reasonable-
ness analysis. Harris and Oncale require that courts focus on the plain-
tiff’s perspective, yet the reasonableness standard has been shown to be 
fungible enough that “humiliating” treatment has led to completely dif-
ferent outcomes.
In a case with a similar pattern of harassment to the one the Fourth 
Circuit addressed in Parker, the Sixth Circuit recently reversed a sum-
mary judgment finding for a defendant employer based on similar rea-
soning.95 In Harper v. Elder, Wendy Harper, an employee at a jail, al-
leged that her coworker Brad Conaway sexually harassed her and that 
her boss retaliated against her for reporting Conaway’s misconduct to 
him.96 Harper alleged that Conaway “asked about her romantic availa-
bility, complimented her physical appearance, and made overt sexual 
91. Parker, 915 F.3d at 304.
92. Parker, 915 F.3d at 305.
93. The case also involved a retaliation claim, which requires the plaintiff to be “objec-
tively reasonable” in believing she was subjected to gender discrimination at the time 
she files a complaint. Parker, 915 F.3d at 300. Since the Fourth Circuit upheld her
claim, by implication, Parker was objectively reasonable in perceiving a hostile work 
environment. Id.
94. Paskert v. Kemna-ASA Auto Plaza, Inc., 950 F.3d 535, 538 (8th Cir. 2020).
95. Harper v. Elder, 803 F. App’x 853, 854-55 (6th Cir. 2020).
96. Harper, 803 F. App’x at 855.
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advances.”97 When Harper rejected Conaway, he “frequently yelled at 
her” in front of her colleagues, “ordered her around,” and at one point 
“intentionally drove his pickup truck in her direction as they left work, 
coming within inches of hitting [her].”98 When Conaway was promot-
ed, he “routinely selected Harper over her male colleagues for menial 
tasks,” and, due to Conaway’s repeated harassment, Harper ultimately 
left her job.99 The district court held that her allegations did not meet 
the severe or pervasive standard and granted summary judgment to the 
defendant.100
The circuit court reversed, holding that the conduct Harper de-
scribed “could make a reasonable person in Harper’s position feel that 
her workplace is hostile,” in particular noting that Harper called the 
harassment “a daily thing” and that there was “a years-long ‘succession 
of harassing acts.’”101 The court also noted that the harassment unrea-
sonably interfered with Harper’s work performance as she suffered mi-
graines and nausea due to stress from the harassment, leading to a doc-
tor’s prescription for medical leave.102 Thus, while the court did not ex-
expressly invoke the subjective element of the reasonableness test, it did 
find Harper’s perception of and response to the harassment to be objec-
tively reasonable.103 In other words, the court defined harassment in part 
based on its effects on the victim—which is, in fact, already a Harris fac-
tor in the context of unreasonable interference with work.104 While 
Harper’s case, given the repetitive nature of the harassment and its dura-
tion, could have met the severe or pervasive standard pre-#MeToo in 
many courts, the district court did not appear to think it did. By grant-
ing summary judgment to the defendant, the district court showed that 
not only did it believe this type of behavior was not sexual harassment, 
but also no reasonable jury could deem it as such. But the Sixth Cir-
cuit’s focus on the harm the plaintiff suffered, without treating this as 
97. Harper, 803 F. App’x at 855.
98. Harper, 803 F. App’x at 855 (quotation marks omitted).
99. Harper, 803 F. App’x at 855.
100. Harper, 803 F. App’x at 855.
101. Harper, 803 F. App’x at 856.
102. Harper, 803 F. App’x at 856.
103. See Harper, 803 F. App’x at 856. Courts often avoid discussion of the subjective eval-
uation since, if the objective standard is met, the subjective one likely is too. Cf.
Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 955 F.2d 559, 565-66 (8th Cir. 1992) (using 
the objective reasonable person standard to reverse a district court’s holding that a 
plaintiff could not have been subjectively harmed by workplace harassment that in-
cluded showing her pornography since she had previously posed for nude photo-
graphs).
104. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
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part of the subjective element of reasonableness, shows how courts can 
incorporate a plaintiff’s experience into the objective prong of the test. 
In so doing, the Sixth Circuit demonstrates how courts can, given the 
fungibility of reasonableness, evolve alongside the societal, #MeToo-
driven shift in understandings of what constitutes sexual harassment.
In Hernandez, the Fourth Circuit accepted smaller or less repeated 
acts as significant enough to constitute a hostile work environment, and, 
in Parker, it accepted a single rumor as sufficient.105 This approach may 
not be novel, but taken together it is nonetheless more deferential to the 
victim of harassment. While in Harper, the harassing behavior was more 
regular, the Sixth Circuit’s willingness to treat lesser offenses such as 
yelling, coupled with other advances, as part of a hostile work environ-
ment is also more deferential to the plaintiff than courts, including the 
Sixth Circuit itself, have been pre-#MeToo.106 In light of the speed at 
which social understandings of sexual harassment have evolved, that the 
lower courts held that the offending conduct in these cases did not cre-
ate a hostile work environment seems all the more retrograde.
Certain EEOC administrative cases have also led to reversal of 
agency decisions that deny that conduct is sufficiently severe or perva-
sive. This suggests a greater willingness by the EEOC to broaden the na-
ture of the conduct that it deems reasonably could create a hostile work 
environment. In Lida G. v. Perdue, handed down a few months after 
#MeToo began, the EEOC reversed a Department of Agriculture agen-
cy review that found the activity the complainant alleged was not severe 
or pervasive enough.107 The complainant, a worker in a grain inspection 
unit of the Department of Agriculture, alleged that a coworker, possibly 
intoxicated, asked her to sit in his lap and told her “you know you want 
105. Consider again precedent across circuits for treating even repeated, physical acts as 
not severe or pervasive enough. See Legrand v. Area Res. for Cmty. & Hum. Servs.,
394 F.3d 1098, 1100, 1102-03 (8th Cir. 2005) (determining three incidents, includ-
ing several inappropriate comments and instances of physical contact, over nine 
months did not amount to a violation); Burnett v. Tyco Corp., 203 F.3d 980, 984-
85 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding that a battery and two offensive remarks over six months 
did not create a hostile work environment); Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 
1238, 1243, 1248-49 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (finding that constantly following 
and staring at the plaintiff, in addition to an instance of physical contact, an inappro-
priate statement, and three instances of sniffing at the plaintiff—two of those times 
while staring at her groin—over eleven months did not meet the necessary frequency 
for a hostile work environment).
106. See, e.g., Burnett, 203 F.3d at 984 (finding that a battery and two offensive remarks 
over six months did not create a hostile work environment).
107. Lida G., EEOC Appeal No. 0120160072, 2017 WL 6729150, at *3 (Dec. 14, 
2017).
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it,” in addition to alleging that he had grabbed her in the past.108 In Le-
lah T. v. Brennan, the EEOC again reversed a federal agency decision on 
reasonableness.109 A supervisor working for the U.S. Postal Service al-
leged that her manager harassed her by making advances and informing 
her about his sexual libido, continuing to make sexually charged re-
marks over the course of a year.110 The Postal Service had found that the 
alleged harassment did not meet the reasonableness standard; the EEOC 
overruled that decision.111 Finally, in Erline S. v. Sessions, the EEOC 
held that a supervisor who grabbed and caressed the complainant and 
thereafter reacted to her with anger and a raised voice on several occa-
sions had objectively and subjectively created a hostile environment due
to the pervasiveness of his actions.112
A traditional view of pervasiveness (or severity, for that matter) 
would not have resulted in these EEOC holdings on severe or pervasive 
harassment, as repeated inappropriate comments have often not risen to 
the traditional reasonableness standard.113 And overall, among the deci-
sions courts have made regarding the reasonableness standard since the 
#MeToo movement began, the above cases appear to apply a reasona-
bleness analysis that favors the victim by treating the victim’s percep-
tions or reactions to the behaviors as evidence that they are harassing in 
nature, and by accepting behaviors that were not traditionally under-
stood to be egregious as legally actionable. Taken together, these cases 
suggest that modern views of what constitutes sexual harassment may be 
seeping in.
2. Avoidance of the Reasonableness Standard
Though some courts have seemingly incorporated the cultural shift 
of the #MeToo movement into their reasonableness approach, others 
have avoided the issue altogether. The First Circuit has notably side-
stepped the reasonableness question while still holding for plaintiffs in 
108. Lida G., 2017 WL 6729150, at *2-3.
109. Lelah T, EEOC Appeal No. 0120172533, 2020 WL 5844335, at *4, *8 (Oct. 24, 
2018).
110. Lelah T., 2020 WL 5844335, at *2.
111. Lelah T., 2020 WL 5844335, at *4.
112. Erline S., EEOC Appeal No. 0120160618, 2016 WL 4771671, at *1-2, *6 (Feb. 22, 
2018).
113. See, e.g., Legrand v. Area Res. for Cmty. & Hum. Servs., 394 F.3d 1098, 1100, 
1102-03 (8th Cir. 2005); Burnett v. Tyco Corp., 203 F.3d 980, 981, 984-85 (6th 
Cir. 2000); Mormol v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 364 F.3d 54, 55, 58-59 (2d Cir. 
2004); Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1251 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
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hostile work environment claims. In Franchina v. City of Providence, the 
First Circuit upheld a decision for a former firefighter who was repeat-
edly called “cunt,” “bitch,” and “lesbo” in the workplace, was spit on 
and shoved, and once had “the blood and brain matter of a suicide-
attempt victim flung at her by a member of her own team.”114 In addi-
tion to those offenses, one of the instigators once rubbed his nipples in 
front the plaintiff; intentionally walked in on her while she was chang-
ing; and would encourage others to refer to the plaintiff, named 
Franchina, as “Frangina,” a combination of her name and the word 
“vagina.”115 The First Circuit upheld a finding of hostile work environ-
ment without commenting on the reasonableness test at all.116
This appears to be a trend for the First Circuit. In Roy v. Correct 
Care Solutions, Tara Roy, a nurse at a Maine Department of Corrections 
prison, was subjected to derogatory jokes and comments—including 
suggestions that a woman’s “job is to be at home”—and mistreatment 
from prison guards who left her alone with inmates, repeatedly called 
her a “bitch,” and made sexual advances that included sending her sex-
ually explicit text messages.117 Though the district court held that a rea-
sonable jury could not determine that Roy had been subjected to a hos-
tile work environment, the First Circuit disagreed and remanded the 
case for trial, without commenting at all on the reasonableness of Roy’s 
experiencing this as harassment. Instead, it offered a recitation of the 
facts of the case with sparse commentary that a jury could, given those 
facts, find that the behavior was severe or pervasive.118
In Franchina, the First Circuit certainly pulled no punches: The 
court chastised the defendant for “attempts to trivialize the abuse,” call-
ing it “nothing short of abhorrent.”119 By omitting a reasonableness 
analysis without explanation, the First Circuit leaves its logic open for 
interpretation, but in all likelihood, given the specific facts of these two 
cases, the First Circuit saw no need to discuss the reasonableness stand-
ard in light of what the court saw as such obvious cases of sexual har-
assment.
While the First Circuit has found for plaintiffs in these cases, the 
court’s avoidance of the reasonableness standard may leave plaintiffs 
114. Franchina v. City of Providence, 881 F.3d 32, 37 (1st Cir. 2018). The court deter-
mined that the plaintiff’s claims taken together constituted a hostile work environ-
ment. Id. at 55.
115. Franchina, 881 F.3d at 39-40.
116. Franchina, 881 F.3d at 55.
117. Roy v. Correct Care Sols., LLC, 914 F.3d 52, 57-58 (1st Cir. 2019).
118. Roy, 914 F.3d at 64.
119. Franchina, 881 F.3d at 38, 61.
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with dissimilar claims unsure of what facts, going forward, are sufficient 
to win a hostile work environment claim.
C. #MeToo Backlash
Even as some courts have demonstrated a willingness to expand 
their application of the reasonableness test, others have followed the op-
posite path, construing reasonableness more narrowly than most pre-
#MeToo courts. Going beyond just maintaining the pre-#MeToo ap-
proach, the Seventh Circuit’s response could even be deemed a #MeToo 
backlash.120 In 2018, in Swyear v. Fare Foods Corporation, Amy Swyear, 
a former sales representative, alleged a hostile work environment by 
claiming that her coworkers referred to one woman customer as 
“Cunty” and another as “Big Tittie Blonde Carnie.”121 On a business 
trip, Swyear’s coworker repeatedly made sexual advances, insinuated 
that they should skinny-dip together, touched her back, and eventually 
entered her hotel room and crawled into her bed, suggesting that she 
needed a “cuddle buddy.”122 Though the coworker left after Swyear’s re-
quests that he do so, he came back to her room throughout the night 
and knocked on her door repeatedly.123 When Swyear reported this be-
havior to a supervisor, the company determined that no discipline was 
necessary.124 When evaluating the objective and subjective components 
of Swyear’s hostile work environment claim, the Seventh Circuit con-
ceded that Swyear subjectively found the environment “to be sexist and 
offensive.”125 The court emphasized, however, that Swyear felt “in con-
trol of the situation,” therefore inferring her coworker’s actions “were 
much less threatening and severe” than the kinds of acts the court had 
120. Though the #MeToo movement has not yet experienced a more concerted form of 
backlash, there have been naysayers—within the feminist movement and outside it—
who critique the outcome of #MeToo as a slippery slope toward a puritanical society 
and/or one lacking (social) due process. See, e.g., Daphne Merkin, Publicly, We Say 
#MeToo. Privately, We Have Misgivings. N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/05/opinion/golden-globes-metoo.html 
[https://perma.cc/P5B4-V5KY]; Jia Tolentino, The Rising Pressure of the #MeToo 
Backlash, NEW YORKER (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-
desk/the-rising-pressure-of-the-metoo-backlash [https://perma.cc/G8L7-AU5D].
121. Swyear v. Fare Foods Corp., 911 F.3d 874, 878 (7th Cir. 2018).
122. Swyear, 911 F.3d at 879.
123. Swyear, 911 F.3d at 879.
124. Swyear, 911 F.3d at 879.
125. Swyear, 911 F.3d at 881.
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found would create a hostile work environment.126 With respect to the 
objective standard, the court determined that a reasonable person would 
not find the environment hostile. It cited pre-#MeToo precedents from 
as far back as 2002127 to hold that a reasonable person should have “the 
thick skin that comes from living in the modern world.”128
Implicit in its application of a “thick skin” standard is a critique, 
intentional or not, of the #MeToo movement. There is hardly a more 
dismissive phrase the Seventh Circuit could have used to inform Swyear 
that her perception of her treatment was unreasonable, especially given 
the extreme facts of her case. The “thick skin” colloquialism chastises 
the plaintiff for bringing the claim at all and evokes long-standing stere-
otypes of over-emotional or hyper-sensitive women—stereotypes at odds 
with the changing discourse surrounding women’s allegations of sexual 
harassment.129
The Seventh Circuit’s view of the level of severity or pervasiveness 
necessary to create a hostile work environment better aligns with not 
only a pre-#MeToo understanding of sexual harassment but perhaps 
even a pre-Harris one, where only the most egregious behavior—such as 
126. Swyear, 911 F.3d at 882.
127. Swyear, 911 F.3d at 881 (citing Hilt-Dyson v. City of Chicago, 282 F.3d 456, 463 
(7th Cir. 2002)).
128. Swyear, 911 F.3d at 881 (citing Passananti v. Cook County, 689 F.3d 655, 667 (7th 
Cir. 2012)). This is far from the first time the Seventh Circuit has indicated that dis-
crimination claims operate on a sliding scale of the victim’s sensitivities. See, e.g.,
Johnson v. Advoc. Health & Hosps. Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 900 (7th Cir. 2018) 
(holding for an employer in a race discrimination case on the basis that “[w]e expect a 
certain level of maturity and thick skin from employees”). The First and Fourth Cir-
cuits have also used the phrase in past decisions. See, e.g., Suarez v. Pueblo Int’l, Inc., 
229 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2000) (“The workplace is not a cocoon, and those who la-
bor in it are expected to have reasonably thick skins—thick enough, at least, to sur-
vive the ordinary slings and arrows that workers routinely encounter in a hard, cold 
world.”); Webb v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 57 F.3d 1067 at *4 (4th Cir. 1995) (un-
published table decision) (describing the Harris standard as requiring the plaintiff to 
“prove her case both objectively and subjectively; standing alone, a thin skin cannot 
create a case”). An unpublished decision, Webb does not have precedential value; sub-
sequent Fourth Circuit decisions, in particular the more expansive ones post-
#MeToo, do not necessarily repudiate the “thick skin” standard, but appear to quiet-
ly disregard this view. See supra Section II.B.
129. The “thick skin” standard may seem at odds with the “eggshell skull” standard from 
tort law—that a defendant is responsible for the entirety of the harm the plaintiff suf-
fers, regardless of whether the plaintiff had a particular sensitivity to the harm (in 
other words, you take your victim as you find him). See, e.g., Vosberg v. Putney, 50 
N.W. 403, 404 (Wis. 1891). The key difference here is that the “eggshell skull” anal-
ysis allows exploration of the plaintiff’s sensitivities with respect to damages and not 
as part of evaluating whether a harm occurred in the first place. Id.
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the repeated rape at issue in Meritor—rises to the level of sexual harass-
ment.130 In 2018, in EEOC v. Costco Wholesale Corporation, the Seventh 
Circuit upheld a jury verdict finding a hostile work environment after a 
customer stalked a Costco employee for more than a year.131 The court 
easily concluded that a reasonable juror could determine that being 
stalked for over a year created a hostile work environment; it did not 
even address the subjective reasonableness of the victim’s perception of 
the environment.132 For the court, the severity of stalking, as a matter of 
safety, distinguished this conduct from that of the defendant in Swyear,
in which the plaintiff was “in control,” but took offense to her cowork-
er’s behavior.133 The Seventh Circuit has maintained a high bar for what 
constitutes a hostile environment since well before the #MeToo move-
ment, even after the Supreme Court handed down the Harris reasona-
bleness standard. Among the actions it has considered not severe or per-
vasive enough to rise to the level of a hostile work environment are: a 
supervisor groping a plaintiff, otherwise touching her inappropriately, 
and asking her out on dates; and a supervisor repeatedly kissing, touch-
ing, and chasing the plaintiff.134 And in a post-#MeToo world, it took 
an egregious, widely agreed-upon form of physical unsafety for the Sev-
enth Circuit to treat the behavior as illegal sexual harassment. In con-
trast, the First Circuit treated verbal sexually explicit advances alone as 
obvious forms of sexual harassment.135
The Fifth Circuit employs a similarly high threshold for what con-
stitutes sexual harassment. Consider its 2019 decision, Gardner v. CLC 
of Pascagoula, in which a nurse in an assisted living home experienced 
years of unwanted sexual grabbing and explicit comments from a patient 
with dementia.136 A district court determined that this did not meet the 
130. Recall that in Harris, the Supreme Court explained that the egregious actions in Mer-
itor do not “mark the boundary of what is actionable.” Harris v. Forklift Sys, Inc., 
510 U.S. 367, 371 (1993).
131. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 903 F.3d 618, 621 
(7th Cir. 2018).
132. Costco Wholesale Corp., 903 F.3d at 626-27.
133. Swyear, 911 F.3d at 882.
134. See MacKinnon, supra note 1, at 6 (citing Kolesch v. Beltone Elecs. Corp., 46 F.3d 
705, 709 (7th Cir. 1995); Saxton v. Am. Tel. & Tel., 10 F.3d 526, 534 (7th Cir. 
1993)) (both cases decided post-Harris but pre-Oncale).
135. See, e.g., Franchina v. City of Providence, 881 F.3d 32, 37 (1st Cir. 2018); Roy v. 
Correct Care Sols., LLC, 914 F.3d 52, 58 (1st Cir. 2019).
136. Gardner v. CLC of Pascagoula, LLC, 915 F.3d 320, 325 (5th Cir. 2019). Though 
the case involved third-party harassment from a non-employee, employers can be lia-
ble for third-party harassers, such as customers. See, e.g., Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 
162 F.3d 1062 (10th Cir. 1998).
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severe or pervasive standard, but the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that 
a reasonable jury could determine that the objective and subjective rea-
sonableness standards were met.137 The nature of the harassment—
which included multiple incidents of sexual assault via groping or sexual 
grabbing—likely distinguishes this hostile work environment claim 
from the allegations of repeated sexual commentary in a case like Malin.
There, the Fifth Circuit held that a reasonable person would not believe 
that graphic sexual commentary from a human resources manager who 
was a woman was severe or pervasive.138 What might seem like a defer-
ential decision to the plaintiff in Gardner in fact reflects a high standard 
of repeated, physical, and unsafe conduct, leaving plaintiffs suffering 
from sexual harassment that is verbal or not physically endangering with 
no recourse. Meritorious claims in the court of public opinion, let alone 
other circuits, fail merely because of the plaintiff’s misfortune of falling 
within the Fifth Circuit’s jurisdiction.
Why would courts excuse inappropriate commentary more readily 
than overtly physical forms of sexual harassment? One probable explana-
tion is line-drawing. Since Oncale, courts fear policing the workplace 
and introducing the much-feared court-created “civility code.”139 An-
other explanation is the continued devaluing of emotional harms caused 
by non-physical forms of sexual harassment as real harms that would af-
fect a reasonable person. Through changing the social standards around 
sexual harassment, the #MeToo movement is attempting to eliminate 
these barriers and in many cases has done so; but the legal system has 
not yet entirely caught up.
III. Reasonableness of the Victim in (Not) Reporting 
Harassment Under the FARAGHER-ELLERTH Standard
As discussed above, the companion cases Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth gave rise to the Faragher-
Ellerth affirmative defense to sexual harassment claims.140 This affirma-
tive defense allows an employer to assert that an employee was unrea-
sonable in her efforts to report the harassment.141 The two-pronged test 
requires that the employer show it exercised reasonable care to prevent 
137. Gardner, 915 F.3d at 327.
138. Malin v. Orleans Par. Commc’ns Dist., 718 F. App’x 264, 266 (5th Cir. 2018).
139. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
140. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 745 (1998); Faragher v. City of Bo-
ca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
141. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 745; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
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and correct the harassing behavior, and that the plaintiff unreasonably 
failed to take advantage of the employer’s corrective opportunities.142
Appellate review of the second reasonableness prong of this defense 
post-#MeToo has been scarce. But as discussed below in Section III.B, 
the Third Circuit has made a dramatic departure from the pre-#MeToo 
standard, which could pave the way for a new legal understanding of 
how a victim reasonably responds to sexual harassment.
Psychologists, academics, and activists explored the reasons victims 
of sexual harassment may not report their harassment long before #Me-
Too took hold. In 1995, psychologists Louise F. Fitzgerald and Suzanne 
Swan elucidated ten strategies, based on their research, used by victims 
dealing with harassment.143 They found that the external process of seek-
ing institutional or organizational relief was by far the most infrequent 
response to sexual harassment.144 In fact, Fitzgerald and Swan found that 
“the least confrontational responses” were the most commonplace, while 
victims would only report via formal complaints or similar actions “as a 
last resort when all other efforts [had] failed.”145 Some scholars consider 
sexual harassment the most pervasive form of violence against women, 
and perhaps the most tolerated.146 In many if not most circumstances, it 
therefore would be more reasonable to avoid an institutionalized process 
than to go through one, as such a process will not result in any actual 
change, or worse, might encourage retaliatory or other negative behavior 
against the complainant by her harasser or even her workplace. The Fa-
ragher-Ellerth defense, then, at least in its original interpretation, places 
the victim in a circular dilemma: Making a complaint could make her 
142. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 745; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
143. See generally Louise F. Fitzgerald & Suzanne Swan, Why Didn’t She Just Report Him? 
The Psychological and Legal Implications of Women’s Responses to Sexual Harassment, J.
SOC. ISSUES, Spring 1995, at 117 (detailing the research the authors conducted re-
garding victim behavior, as well as the ten strategies victims deployed in response to 
sexual harassment).
144. Id. at 121. Some research suggests as few as 25% of women who experience sexual 
harassment use a complaint procedure, within their company or with the EEOC, to 
report their harassment. Lauren Edelman, How HR and Judges Made It Almost Impos-
sible for Victims of Sexual Harassment to Win in Court, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 22, 
2018), hbr.org/2018/08/how-hr-and-judges-made-it-almost-impossible-for-victims-
of-sexual-harassment-to-win-in-court [https://perma.cc/8T9R-WXQZ].
145. Fitzgerald & Swan, supra note 143, at 121. Considering that there is a spectrum of 
responses to workplace sexual harassment, and that there is no one typical behavior, 
such studies prompt the question: At what point should we deem a victim to be un-
reasonable?
146. See generally Louise F. Fitzgerald, Still the Last Great Open Secret: Sexual Harassment 
as Systemic Trauma, 18 J. TRAUMA & DISSOCIATION 483 (2017) (detailing the perva-
siveness of sexual harassment against women).
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circumstances at work worse, but she is required by law to make a com-
plaint before taking steps to make her situation better.147
A. Post-#MeToo, the Continuation of Pre-#MeToo Standards
Despite research indicating the typical behavior of victims, general-
ly speaking, failure to report is fatal to a plaintiff’s case unless she can 
demonstrate a reasonable fear of retaliation or similar consequences. 
Failure to report the right way can also vindicate an employer’s affirma-
tive defense.148 In a post-#MeToo case in January 2018, the Fourth Cir-
cuit addressed the defense in a case in which a plaintiff alleged a 
coworker “found her in a supply closet, closed the door, kissed her, and 
while restraining her with his hands managed to undo his belt, pull his 
pants down, undo [the] Plaintiff’s belt, and pull her pants down” before 
they were interrupted.149 Because the plaintiff only “shared her allega-
tion with two non-supervisory individuals” the court held that she had 
unreasonably failed to take advantage of her company’s procedures.150
The court relied on the same standard it had applied pre-#MeToo un-
147. MacKinnon, supra note 1, at 1095. A perhaps obvious solution to this dilemma, from 
the perspective of a court, is to “demand less of complainants and more of employers. 
Definitions of harassment should include a more expansive understanding, informed 
by social science research, about what kinds of behavior interfere with workplace per-
formance and when it is reasonable for victims to avoid internal complaint channels.”
Rhode, supra note 21, at 422. See also Vicki Schultz, Open Statement on Sexual Har-
assment from Employment Discrimination Law Scholars, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 17
(2018).
148. For example, reporting too long after the fact of the sexual harassment can be fatal to 
this defense. See, e.g., Jenna P., EEOC Appeal No. 0120150825, 2018 WL 1392300 
(Mar. 9, 2018). In Jenna P., the complainant, an analyst for the Department of Vet-
erans Affairs, alleged that her supervisor continually made comments about her cloth-
ing and appearance which quickly turned sexual, culminating in her supervisor expos-
ing his penis to her and groping her, among other lewd acts. Id. at *1. The EEOC
reversed an agency holding against liability due to a Faragher-Ellerth defense. Id. at 
*6. The agency determined the complainant “unreasonably delayed” reporting the 
behavior, since she did not do so for almost a year. Id. at *2. The complainant argued 
that she delayed reporting in order to gather tangible evidence of the harassment. Id. 
at *2-3. In its decision, the EEOC focused on the first prong of the Faragher-Ellerth 
defense, and side-stepped the issue of the complainant’s reasonableness, but the agen-
cy’s holding nonetheless demonstrates a pervasive, anti-plaintiff attitude regarding 
timing of a complaint, even post-#MeToo. Id. at *6.
149. Lacasse v. Didlake, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 3d 494, 498 (E.D. Va. 2016), aff’d 712 F. 
App’x 231 (4th Cir. 2018).
150. Lacasse v. Didlake, Inc., 712 F. App’x 231, 238 (4th Cir. 2018).
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der which proof that an employee failed to follow a complaint proce-
dure normally fulfills this element of the Faragher-Ellerth defense.151
The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have indicated that they, too, 
will continue to take the same approach to this defense that they took 
pre-#MeToo. In 2019, in Hunt v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the Seventh 
Circuit upheld a summary judgment finding for Wal-Mart after an em-
ployee, Tristana Hunt, sued for sexual harassment by her supervisor 
Daniel Watson.152 Watson had been accused of sexual harassment with-
in Wal-Mart before.153 Prior to Hunt’s work with him, Wal-Mart had 
received two complaints from a different employee regarding Watson’s 
behavior, and had given him written instruction twice that he was not 
performing up to Wal-Mart’s standards.154 Hunt herself also alleged re-
peated sexual harassment by Watson.155 When they first met, he “asked 
her why she was wearing a particular shirt, saying that he could see her 
breasts, and then commented that he did not understand how a woman 
could have breasts so large despite having a small body.”156 A month lat-
er he made another comment about her breasts and later told her he 
wanted to shower with her.157 Later still, when Hunt showed Watson a 
picture of a fallen tree on her phone to explain how inclement weather 
had prevented her from getting to work, he took the phone and “indi-
cated he was looking through it for naked pictures . . . and again asked 
when he could see her breasts.”158 He repeated the same advances several 
times thereafter.159 Hunt eventually filed a complaint four months after 
the harassment began; the store manager had Watson complete an anti-
harassment course in response, and Hunt did not report or subsequently 
allege new instances of sexual harassment between then and filing her 
lawsuit.160
In evaluating the first prong of the Faragher-Ellerth defense—that 
the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent the harassing behav-
ior—the Seventh Circuit held that “no reasonable jury could find that 
151. Lacasse, 712 F. App’x at 238 (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 
742, 765 (1998)). Psychologists and sociologists have expressed skepticism at the effi-
cacy of having internal anti-harassment or complaint policy/procedures on the books, 
without more. See Tippett, supra note 28, at 244.
152. Hunt v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 931 F.3d 624, 626 (7th Cir. 2019).
153. Hunt, 931 F.3d at 626.
154. Hunt, 931 F.3d at 626.
155. Hunt, 931 F.3d at 626.
156. Hunt, 931 F.3d at 626.
157. Hunt, 931 F.3d at 626.
158. Hunt, 931 F.3d at 626.
159. Hunt, 931 F.3d at 626-27.
160. Hunt, 931 F.3d at 627.
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Wal-Mart acted unreasonably” because of its “comprehensive policy 
that explicitly prohibited sexual harassment” and “robust” choices “for 
reporting retaliation.”161 Much like the Fourth Circuit, the court treated 
the adoption of an anti-harassment policy as the key factor in determin-
ing whether the employer exercised reasonable care.162 For the second 
prong—the evaluation of the plaintiff’s reasonableness—the court 
deemed the delay of four months to be unreasonable and therefore fatal 
to Hunt’s case.163 In doing so, it relied on past Seventh Circuit prece-
dent that “an employee’s subjective fears of confrontation, unpleasant-
ness or retaliation do not alleviate the employee’s duty to alert the em-
ployer to the allegedly hostile environment.”164
The significance of a defendant having an existing anti-sexual har-
assment policy seemed to sway the Eleventh Circuit in 2019 in Joyner v. 
Woodspring Hotels Property Management.165 In that case, Dorothea Joyn-
er, a hotel employee, alleged that a manager was spreading rumors that 
she had been promoted due to an affair with someone higher up.166
Joyner heard the rumor repeated several times and after she had been 
terminated sent a letter to the company informing it of the behavior.167
But the Eleventh Circuit focused heavily on the fact that the company 
“had policies in place to prevent sexual harassment.”168 For the second 
prong of the Faragher-Ellerth defense, the court held that by failing to 
report until after her termination, Joyner “failed to take full advantage”
of the reporting mechanisms available, and determined that “fear of ret-
ribution”—which Joyner alleged was her reason for not reporting until 
after her termination—“is not a valid reason for failing to use a compa-
ny’s reporting procedures.”169
This approach is out of step with the known behavior of victims of 
sexual harassment, especially considering the rational nature of a fear of 
retaliation. But unfortunately for plaintiffs, if a defendant succeeds on 
the first prong of the Faragher-Ellerth defense, a court’s application of 
the second prong could logically be quite favorable to the defendant. 
161. Hunt, 931 F.3d at 630.
162. Hunt, 931 F.3d at 630.
163. Hunt, 931 F.3d at 631.
164. Hunt, 931 F.3d at 631 (quoting Porter v. Erie Foods Int’l, 576 F.3d 629, 638 (7th 
Cir. 2009)).
165. Joyner v. Woodspring Hotels Prop. Mgmt. LLC, 785 F. App’x 771, 774 (11th Cir. 
2019).
166. Joyner, 785 F. App’x at 773.
167. Joyner, 785 F. App’x at 773.
168. Joyner, 785 F. App’x at 774.
169. Joyner, 785 F. App’x at 775.
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For instance, an EEOC case from August 2018 chastised a complainant 
for neglecting to participate in an EEOC administrative hearing.170 The 
complainant, a city carrier for the U.S. Postal Service, alleged sexual 
harassment by a coworker, including the coworker exposing his penis to 
her during a Facetime call—an incident she did not initially report—
and later following her to her car and jumping in.171 It was at this point 
that she reported both incidents.172 The coworker admitted to the first, 
but not the second, allegation.173 The Postal Service denied liability be-
cause it took immediate and corrective action following the plaintiff’s
report by separating the parties and conducting an investigation.174
Though the EEOC did not explicitly refer to the Faragher-Ellerth de-
fense, it effectively applied that defense in its analysis of both the agen-
cy’s and complainant’s actions.175 It agreed that the agency acted appro-
priately but also indirectly reprimanded the complainant for her 
behavior, noting “that [the] first incident was never brought to the at-
tention of management” and that the complainant opted not to “take 
advantage of” the “opportunity to have an EEOC administrative hear-
ing.”176 Based on the factors the EEOC used to make its decision, a Fa-
ragher-Ellerth evaluation from this bench would have held the com-
plainant had been unreasonable by failing to inform the Postal Service 
through its established procedures so it could learn of the harassment 
and take the same corrective action it later pursued.
B. The Path Toward Expansion
Despite past unfavorable treatment of plaintiffs at the second 
prong of the Faragher-Ellerth defense, the Third Circuit has made a ma-
jor departure from the standard approach to denying plaintiffs’ reasona-
bleness when they do not come forward to report. In April 2018, the 
Third Circuit expressly incorporated post-#MeToo understandings of 
victims’ behavior into its decision in Minarsky v. Susquehanna County.177
In particular, it noted that “a mere failure to report one’s harassment is 
170. Regena L., EEOC Appeal No. 0120170416, 2018 WL 4358892, at *3 (Aug. 2, 
2018).
171. Regena L., 2018 WL 4358892, at *1-2.
172. Regena L., 2018 WL 4358892, at *1-2.
173. Regena L., 2018 WL 4358892, at *2.
174. Regena L., 2018 WL 4358892, at *2.
175. Regena L., 2018 WL 4358892, at *3.
176. Regena L., 2018 WL 4358892, at *3.
177. Minarsky v. Susquehanna County, 895 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 2018).
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not per se unreasonable” and could be motivated by the perceived “fu-
tility of reporting” said harassment.178 Sheri Minarsky, a part-time secre-
tary at the Susquehanna County Department of Veterans Affairs, was 
the victim of physical and non-physical sexual harassment by her super-
visor, who would massage her shoulders, attempt to kiss her on the lips 
at the end of the workday, touch her face, question her about her 
whereabouts, call her at home on her days off, and send her sexually ex-
plicit messages from his work email.179 Minarsky’s employer raised the 
Faragher-Ellerth defense, suggesting Minarsky did not take advantage of 
reporting mechanisms the office had in place.180 In response, Minarsky 
noted that, as someone depending on her employment to pay medical 
bills for her ill daughter, she feared speaking up to her supervisor about 
his harassment in case he reacted and became “nasty.”181 For similar rea-
sons, she feared disclosing his harassment to anyone else at her work.182
In keeping with typical applications of the defense, when the lower 
court examined prong two, it found that Minarsky had acted unreason-
ably in failing to report the harassment and granted summary judgment 
for her employer.183 But noting “national news regarding a veritable fire-
storm of allegations of rampant sexual misconduct that has been closet-
ed for years, not reported by victims,” the Third Circuit reversed, hold-
ing that this was instead a jury question.184 Its decision determined that 
fear of speaking up could very reasonably prevent a plaintiff from re-
porting harassment.185
Apart from Minarsky and the decisions discussed above that relied 
on pre-#MeToo rationales, circuit courts have addressed the Faragher-
Ellerth defense nominally, if at all, as few cases have arisen since #Me-
Too began that created the need to do so.186 But Minarsky offers striking 
insight into the potential for #MeToo to change the legal landscape for 
178. Minarsky, 895 F.3d at 314.
179. Minarsky, 895 F.3d at 306-07.
180. Minarsky, 895 F.3d at 311-12.
181. Minarsky, 895 F.3d at 307.
182. Minarsky, 895 F.3d at 314.
183. Minarsky, 895 F.3d at 311.
184. Minarsky, 895 F.3d at 313 n.12.
185. Minarsky, 895 F.3d at 314.
186. The Second and Fourth Circuits have handed down other decisions in cases involv-
ing the Faragher-Ellerth defense since Minarsky, but neither court meaningfully 
commented on the defense in doing so. Berrie v. Bd. of Educ. of Port Chester-Rye 
Union Free Sch. Dist., 750 F. App’x 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2018) (reaching no conclusion 
about a district court’s application of the defense); Nzabandora v. Rectors & Visitors 
of Univ. of Virginia, 749 F. App’x 173, 177 (4th Cir. 2018) (affirming a district 
court’s holding of a successful Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense).
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victims of sexual harassment. For the Third Circuit to explicitly tie its 
understanding of the reasonableness of a victim’s response to harassment 
to the prevalence of news coverage stemming from #MeToo shows that 
#MeToo has the potential, thirty-five years after Meritor established 
sexual harassment as a legal claim, to accomplish a legal recalibration of 
what constitutes an appropriate expectation of victim behavior.
IV. Conclusion
There is no question that the #MeToo movement has shifted cul-
tural norms and expectations. Theoretically, “reasonableness” is an elas-
tic enough standard to shift with evolving perceptions of acceptable 
workplace behavior and to incorporate modern understandings of what 
may constitute victims’ responsive behaviors. But reasonableness is de-
fined by its fit within the status quo; it is a reflection of the existing so-
cietal dynamic (or the dynamic of the particular jury, if a reasonableness 
evaluation makes it to one). Before #MeToo, the status quo treated sex-
ual harassment as valid only in its most brutal or shocking forms. As the 
#MeToo movement begins to shift the status quo, the reasonableness 
standard, despite its past failings but precisely due to its elasticity, also 
creates the most room for vindication of long-mistreated claims of hos-
tile work environments and long-existing misunderstandings of victims’
decisions not to report sexual harassment.
In the 1970s, the legal system resisted acknowledging sexual har-
assment as a form of sex discrimination at all.187 Just as courts expanded 
the legal conception of discrimination on the basis of sex to incorporate 
sexual harassment, they are capable of expanding the legal conception of 
sexual harassment to incorporate a wider range of victims’ perceptions 
and behaviors as reasonable. Though there is a long way to go, the 
#MeToo movement has already started to make that happen.
187. See Reva Siegal, Introduction to DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 1, 11-13
(Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegal, eds., Yale University Press 2004).
